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Abstract
The theory of p-modulus provides a general framework for quantifying the richness of a
family of objects on a graph. When applied to the family of spanning trees, p-modulus has an
interesting probabilistic interpretation. In particular, the 2-modulus problem in this case has
been shown to be equivalent to the problem of finding a probability distribution on spanning
trees that utilizes the edges of the graph as evenly as possible. In the present work, we use this
fact to produce a game-theoretic interpretation of modulus by employing modulus to solve a
secure broadcast game.
1 Introduction
1.1 Secure broadcast games
A communication network is often modeled as a collection of nodes and links. For example, in a
wired computer network, nodes can represent personal computers and links can represent transmis-
sion media such as Ethernet cables. Mathematically, such a network is often modeled by a graph
G = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices corresponding to the nodes and E is the set of edges
corresponding to the links.
A (one-to-all) broadcast in a network is a method of sending a message from a source node to
all other nodes in the network by utilizing a subset of the network links. If the goal is to use as few
links as possible, then the set of links used will form a spanning tree of the graph G.
The present paper concerns a simple secure broadcast game introduced and analyzed in [10].
Although many modified versions of this game exist (e.g., [9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18]), the focus of this
paper is on the connections between the original game and the theory of p-modulus. The game is
illustrated in Figure 1. In this game, Player B (the broadcaster) wants to broadcast a message to
all other nodes. This is accomplished by choosing a spanning tree to broadcast on. Player E (the
eavesdropper) can observe the transmission along a single link in the link set {e1, e2, . . . , e5}. Player
B wins the game if the spanning tree avoids E’s edge, while Player E wins if the tree includes the
edge. Posed in this way, this is a zero-sum game.
Figure 2 shows four of the eight possible spanning trees that B can use to broadcast. It is easy
to see that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists. Indeed, if B’s spanning tree is known to E, then
E can readily choose to listen on one of its edges. Moreover, if E has chosen an edge, B can easily
avoid it. On the other hand, Nash’s existence theorem shows that a mixed-strategy equilibrium
exists. Consider the following mixed strategies for Player B.
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1515810.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the broadcast game.
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
Figure 2: Four spanning trees of the example network in Figure 1.
• Strategy 1: Use γ1 or γ2 with equal probability. In this case, E can listen on e5 and always
win.
• Strategy 2: Use γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 with equal probability. In this case, E can choose any strategy
that uses only e1 and e2 and win 75% of the time.
• Strategy 3: Use γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 with probabilities 2/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5 respectively. In this case,
E wins 60% of the time with any strategy.
In fact, as a consequence of Theorem 4.2 (the main theorem of this paper) and Theorem 5.1,
Strategy 3 corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.
1.2 Connection to modulus
The classical theory of conformal modulus was originally developed in complex analysis several
decades ago, see Ahlfors comment on p. 81 of [1]. Intuitively, p-modulus provides a method for
quantifying the richness of a family of curves: modulus is large for families containing many short
curves. The p in p-modulus refers to a parameter p ∈ [1,∞]. Modulus tends to favor the “many
curves” aspect when p is close to 1 and the “short curves” aspect as p becomes large.
There are several natural analogs to p-modulus for families of paths on graphs [2,8, 12,16] and
to more general families of objects including spanning trees. As in the continuum case, modulus
provides a quantitative way of describing the richness of a family. Intuitively, modulus will be large
for families containing many objects with small pairwise intersections [4,5]. This can be made more
precise through the minimum expected overlap formulation of modulus (see (11)), where the goal
is to choose random spanning trees that share as few edges as possible on average. This goal is
remarkably similar to that of the broadcaster in the game, which motivates the present work. The
main contribution of this paper is to establish rigorous connections between the solution of the
modulus problem on spanning trees and solutions to the broadcast game.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic definitions and theorems of
p-modulus along with its probabilistic interpretation. Section 3 reviews the broadcast game and
establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria. Section 4 establishes the con-
nection between modulus and the broadcast game. Finally, Section 5 describes the basic modulus
algorithm and demonstrates its use in solving the game.
1.3 Primary contributions
The primary contributions of the present paper are the following.
• Theorem 3.2 provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a mixed-strategy solution
to the secure broadcast game.
• Theorem 4.2 establishes an explicit connection between the 2-modulus problem (formulated
as a minimum expected overlap problem) on the spanning trees of a graph and the solution
to the game.
• Theorem 4.1 along with the discussion in Section 4.1 provides a comparison between the
solution method presented in this paper and other methods for solving the game, such as
those found in [10].
2 Modulus on networks
Let G = (V,E, σ) be a finite graph with vertex set V , edge set E and edge-weights σ ∈ RE>0. The
graph may be directed or undirected and need not be simple.
2.1 Families of objects
A family of objects on G is a pair (Γ,N ), where Γ is a countable (possibly infinite) index set and
N ∈ RΓ×E≥0 is a non-negative, possibly infinite matrix. Often, Γ alone is referred to as the family
and N is called the usage matrix for Γ.
Families of objects used in practice often have a simple interpretation on the graph. For example,
it is common to choose Γ ⊂ 2E and to define the rows of N as indicator functions.
Example 2.1. If Γ is the set of spanning trees of G (thought of as subsets of E), we can define
N (γ, e) := 1γ(e)
for γ ∈ Γ and e ∈ E.
This is the family we shall use in the present paper, however the theory of modulus applies to
more general families of objects.
Example 2.2. If a and b are distinct vertices and if Γ is the family of walks in G beginning at a
and ending at b, there are many different options for defining N . For example, we could choose
any of the following definitions.
• N (γ, e) = 1γ(e),
• N (γ, e) = the number of times γ crosses edge e,
• N (γ, e) = `(γ)−11γ(e) where `(γ) is the length of γ.
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Since our goal in this paper is primarily concerned with the modulus of spanning trees, we will
assume in the following discussion that the family Γ is finite. We further assume that Γ is nontrivial
in the sense that Γ 6= ∅ and each object γ ∈ Γ has positive usage on at least one edge. (So N has
at least one row, and no row of N is identically zero.) While N can be thought of as a function
N : Γ×E → R≥0, it is often notationally convenient to represent N as a matrix with rows indexed
by Γ and columns indexed by E. So the (γ, e) entry keeps a record of the usage of the edge e by
the object γ.
2.2 Densities and admissible densities
A density on G is a vector ρ ∈ RE≥0. Choosing a density can be thought of as assigning a cost ρ(e)
for the use of each edge e. Each density, ρ, induces a ρ-length or total usage cost on the family of
objects Γ. The ρ-length of γ ∈ Γ is defined as
`ρ(γ) =
∑
e∈E
N (γ, e)ρ(e) = (Nρ)(γ). (1)
The modulus is defined through the minimization of an energy (defined shortly) over a set of
admissible densities. We say that a density ρ is admissible for Γ if,
`ρ(γ) ≥ 1 ∀γ ∈ Γ, or, equivalently, Nρ ≥ 1,
where 1 is the vector of all ones in RΓ and the inequality is understood elementwise. Using the
latter notation, we define the set of all admissible densities as
Adm Γ = {ρ ∈ RE≥0 : Nρ ≥ 1}.
An alternative notation that is sometimes useful is to define
`ρ(Γ) := min
γ∈Γ
`ρ(γ). (2)
So another way of describing the admissible set is,
Adm Γ = {ρ ∈ RE≥0 : `ρ(Γ) ≥ 1}.
2.3 Energy and modulus
Given an exponent p ≥ 1 we define the p-energy of a density ρ as
Ep,σ(ρ) =
∑
e∈E
σ(e)ρ(e)p.
For p =∞, we also define ∞-energy as
E∞,σ(ρ) = lim
p→∞(Ep,σp(ρ))
1
p = max
e∈E
σ(e)ρ(e).
Definition 2.1. Given a graph G = (V,E, σ), a family of objects Γ with usage matrix N ∈ RΓ×E ,
and an exponent 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, the p-modulus of Γ is,
Modp,σ(Γ) = inf
ρ∈Adm Γ
Ep,σ(ρ).
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In standard optimization notation, p-modulus is the value of the problem
minimize Ep,σ(ρ)
subject to Nρ ≥ 1 and ρ ≥ 0 (3)
where each object γ ∈ Γ determines an inequality constraint. Written in the form of (3), it is
evident that the modulus problem is an ordinary convex optimization problem; geometrically, it
can be described as the problem of finding the distance (in a weighted p-norm) between the closed
set Adm Γ and the origin. Thus, a minimizer always exists, and uniqueness holds when 1 < p <∞
due to the strict convexity of the objective function (see [5]).
Since this paper is focused entirely on the unweighted (σ ≡ 1), and p = 2 case, we will typically
drop the σ from the subscripts above and instead write E2 and Mod2 for the energy and modulus
respectively. As described in [4], this assumption is not very restrictive since the case of weighted
graphs can always be approximated by unweighted multigraphs.
2.4 Probabilistic interpretation
The relationship between modulus and secure broadcast games arises from the probabilistic inter-
pretation of modulus developed in [5]. In this interpretation, we consider an object γ chosen at
random according to a probability mass function (pmf) µ. (The underline in the notation γ is
used to distinguish the random object from its possible values.) In other words, for each γ ∈ Γ,
µ(γ) defines the probability that γ = γ or, in simpler notation, µ(γ) = Pµ(γ = γ). Here we use
the subscript notation Pµ to specify exactly which pmf is being used. We will also represent the
relationship between the random object γ and its pmf µ by the notation γ ∼ µ. The set of all pmfs
on Γ will be represented with the notation P(Γ) := {µ ∈ RΓ≥0 : µT1 = 1}.
If e ∈ E, µ ∈ P(Γ) and γ ∼ µ, then N (γ, e) is a real-valued random variable and we denote its
expected value with respect to µ as Eµ[N (γ, e)]. That is,
Eµ[N (γ, e)] =
∑
γ∈Γ
N (γ, e)µ(γ) = (N Tµ)(e). (4)
Thus, (N Tµ)(e) represents the expected usage of edge e by the random object γ ∼ µ. We will
frequently use the variable η to represent the vector N Tµ ∈ RE .
With this notation, we can now summarize the relevant result from [5]. (This theorem is also
a specialization of [3, Theorem 2.8] to the p = 2 case.)
Theorem 2.1. Let G = (V,E, σ) be a graph and let Γ be a nontrivial finite family of objects on G
with usage matrix N . Then we have,
Mod2,σ(Γ)
−1 = min
µ∈P(Γ)
∑
e∈E
σ(e)−1Eµ[N (γ, e)]2. (5)
The minimum is always attained and µ ∈ P(Γ) is optimal if and only if
Eµ[N (γ, e)] = σ(e)ρ
∗(e)
Mod2,σ(Γ)
, (6)
where ρ∗ is the unique extremal density for Mod2,σ(Γ).
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This probabilistic interpretation has a simple meaning under the assumptions that G is un-
weighted (i.e., σ ≡ 1), Γ is a collection of subsets of E, and N is a matrix of 0’s and 1’s (i.e.,
N (γ, e) is defined through indicator functions as in Example 2.1). Since N is a (0, 1)-matrix,
N (γ, e) is an indicator random variable for the event e ∈ γ. In this case, the expected usage
η(e) := Eµ[N (γ, e)] = (N Tµ)(e) (7)
in equations (4) and (5) is actually a probability of inclusion
η(e) = Pµ(e ∈ γ). (8)
Moreover, the summation in the right-hand side of (5) can be rewritten as
∑
e∈E
η(e)2 =
∑
e∈E
∑
γ∈Γ
N (γ, e)µ(γ)
∑
γ′∈Γ
N (γ′, e)µ(γ′)

=
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
γ′∈Γ
(∑
e∈E
N (γ, e)N (γ′, e)
)
µ(γ)µ(γ′)
=
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
γ′∈Γ
|γ ∩ γ′|µ(γ)µ(γ′) =: Eµ|γ ∩ γ′|.
(9)
Here γ, γ′ ∼ µ are two independent Γ-valued random variables. The quantity |γ ∩ γ′| is the
intersection (overlap) of these two random sets and is, therefore, an integer-valued random variable
with expectation Eµ|γ ∩ γ′|. This latter quantity is called the expected overlap of γ and γ′.
Using (9), the probabilistic interpretation (5) can be expressed as follows.
Mod2(Γ)
−1 = min
µ∈P(Γ)
Eµ|γ ∩ γ′|. (10)
Thus, computing 2-modulus in this case is equivalent to finding a pmf that minimizes the
expected overlap of two iid Γ-valued random variables. The right-hand side of (10) is called the
minimum expected overlap (MEO) problem:
minimize Eµ|γ ∩ γ′|
subject to µ ∈ P(Γ). (11)
When µ∗ is optimal for the MEO problem (11), we define η∗ = N Tµ∗. By (6),
η∗(e) = Pµ∗(e ∈ γ) = Eµ∗ [N (γ, e)] = ρ
∗(e)
Mod2(Γ)
. (12)
Since ρ∗ is unique, so is η∗. In general, however, the pmf µ∗ is non-unique.
Example 2.3. Consider the paw graph shown in Figure 3, with edges enumerated as indicated.
This graph has 3 spanning trees: Γ = {γ1, γ2, γ3}. The pairwise overlaps among these trees satisfy
|γi ∩ γj | =
{
3 if i = j,
2 otherwise.
Let the density ρ take the value 3/7 on edge 1 and 2/7 on other edges. This density is admissible.
Thus, its energy ρTρ = 3/7 forms an upper bound for Mod2(Γ).
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Figure 3: Spanning trees of the paw graph.
On the other hand, let µ ∈ P(Γ) be the uniform distribution. Then the expected overlap is,
Eµ|γ ∩ γ′| = 3Pµ(γ = γ′) + 2Pµ(γ 6= γ′) = 3 · 1
3
+ 2 · 2
3
=
7
3
,
which forms an upper bound for Mod2(Γ)
−1 by (10). That is,
3
7
=
1
Eµ|γ ∩ γ′| ≤ Mod2(Γ) ≤ ρ
Tρ =
3
7
.
Therefore,
Mod2(Γ) = 3/7,
and ρ and µ are optimal for their corresponding minimization problems.
Example 2.4. Consider the graph in Figure 1. This graph has 8 spanning trees, as shown in
Figure 4. To derive an upper bound on Mod2(Γ), observe that ρ ≡ 1/3 is an admissible density.
Therefore,
Mod2(Γ) ≤ E2(ρ) = 5
9
. (13)
Now, consider the pmf µ ∈ P(Γ) defined as
µ(γ) =
{
3
20 if γ contains the diagonal,
2
20 otherwise.
Let ed be the diagonal edge. Since there are four spanning trees containing ed,
η(ed) = 4 · 3
20
=
3
5
.
For all other edges, e 6= ed
η(e) = Pµ(e ∈ γ) = Pµ(e ∈ γ|ed ∈ γ)Pµ(ed ∈ γ) + Pµ(e ∈ γ|ed /∈ γ)Pµ(ed /∈ γ)
=
1
2
(
4 · 3
20
)
+
3
4
(
4 · 2
20
)
=
3
5
.
With this pmf, all edges are equally likely to occur in γ: η(e) = 3/5 on all edges. Therefore the
expected overlap is, by (9),
Eµ|γ ∩ γ′| =
∑
e∈E
η(e)2 = 5
(
3
5
)2
=
9
5
≥ Mod2(Γ)−1,
7
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8
Figure 4: Spanning trees of the diamond graph.
which forms a lower bound for Mod2(Γ). This together with the upper bound (13) shows that both
bounds are attained.
Although the optimal vectors ρ∗ and η∗ are unique, the optimal pmf µ∗ need not be. In
Section 1.1, we described another pmf, namely
µ =
2
5
δγ1 +
1
5
δγ5 +
1
5
δγ6 +
1
5
δγ8 .
It is straightforward to verify that this pmf also has the property that Pµ(e ∈ γ) = 3/5 for each
edge e and is therefore optimal.
The uniform pmf µ ≡ 1/8, on the other hand, is not optimal in this case, since η(ed) = 1/2
while for all other edges e 6= ed, η(e) = 5/8. For the uniform pmf, then, the expected overlap is
Eµ|γ ∩ γ′| =
∑
e∈E
η(e)2 =
(
1
2
)2
+ 4
(
5
8
)2
=
29
16
>
9
5
.
3 A secure broadcast game
When addressing secure broadcasting (or network security in general) a game theoretic approach
is natural due to the rich set of mathematical tools that this approach provides. In this section,
we consider the solution of the secure broadcast game described in Section 1. We show that the
solution to the spanning tree modulus problem provides a Nash equilibrium for the game.
To more carefully define the game, let G = (V,E) be a simple, connected graph representing
a communications network and let Γ be the family of spanning trees on G. The game between B
(the broadcaster) and E (the eavesdropper) proceeds as follows. Player B broadcasts a message
by sending it along a spanning tree γ ∈ Γ. Player E eavesdrops by choosing a single edge e ∈ E
on which to listen. E wins if e ∈ γ. Otherwise, B wins. If we consider this a zero-sum game,
we may assume without loss of generality that the payoff matrix P is equal to N . That is, E
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wishes to maximize N (γ, e) while B wishes to minimize it. Written in this way, it is evident that
a pure-strategy solution to the game generally does not exist. In fact, the following theorem gives
necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. A pure-strategy equilibrium to the secure broadcast game exists if and only if G is
1-edge-connected (that is, if there exists an edge e ∈ E whose removal would disconnect the graph).
Proof. First, suppose that such an edge e exists. Necessarily, this edge exists in every spanning
tree and, thus, N (γ, e) = 1 for all γ ∈ Γ. E wins by selecting this edge. Since E can force a win,
this provides a pure-strategy equilibrium to the game.
Now, suppose that G is at least 2-edge-connected. Assume that B plays first, by choosing a
tree γ ∈ Γ. Then E wins by choosing any e ∈ γ. On the other hand, assume that E plays first by
choosing an edge e ∈ E. Let G′ be the subgraph of G obtained by removing e. By assumption,
G′ is connected, so there exists a spanning tree γ ∈ Γ that is also a spanning tree of G′. B wins
by selecting this tree. Since neither player can force a win in this case, there is no pure-strategy
equilibrium.
In light of Theorem 3.1, a Nash equilibrium for the secure broadcast game will generally involve
mixed strategies. Here we recast the game using probability notation in order to make the connec-
tion to modulus more apparent. More precisely, we suppose that B chooses a pmf u ∈ P(Γ) while
E chooses a pmf v ∈ P(E). This is equivalent to B choosing a random tree γ ∼ u while E chooses
a random edge e ∼ v. The expected payoff for a particular choice of strategies, then, is given by
Eu,v[N (γ, e)] :=
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
e∈E
N (γ, e)u(γ)v(e). (14)
This quantity has a number of useful interpretations. For example, if we define η := N Tu = Pu(· ∈
γ) as in (8), then
Eu,v[N (γ, e)] =
∑
e∈E
η(e)v(e) = Ev[η(e)]. (15)
That is, the expected payoff is equal to the expected value of η on an edge randomly selected
according to the distribution v. On the other hand, if we us the definition of `v(γ) in (1), then
Eu,v[N (γ, e)] =
∑
γ∈Γ
`v(γ)u(γ) = Eu[`v(γ)]. (16)
With this interpretation, the expected payoff is the expected v-length of a random spanning tree
chosen according to the distribution u. Equations (15) and (16) provide a useful way of looking
at necessary and sufficient conditions for solving the game. We begin by reviewing the relevant
concepts in the present context.
First, recall that a pair of mixed strategies (u∗, v∗) ∈ P(Γ)×P(E) solves the game (in the sense
of Nash equilibrium [15]) if the following condition holds.
Eu∗,v[N (γ, e)] ≤ Eu∗,v∗ [N (γ, e)] ≤ Eu,v∗ [N (γ, e)] ∀u ∈ P(Γ) ∀v ∈ P(E). (17)
Alternatively, we can express (17) as
max
v∈P(E)
Eu∗,v[N (γ, e)] = Eu∗,v∗ [N (γ, e)] = min
u∈P(Γ)
Eu,v∗ [N (γ, e)]. (18)
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This form is particularly enlightening when paired with the minimax theorem, which states that
for a general real-valued function f on a product space X × Y ,
sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
f(x, y) ≤ inf
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
f(x, y).
When applied to the problem at hand, the minimax theorem becomes
max
v∈P(E)
min
u∈P(Γ)
Eu,v[N (γ, e)] ≤ min
u∈P(Γ)
max
v∈P(E)
Eu,v[N (γ, e)]. (19)
Nash’s existence theorem [15] guarantees a mixed-strategy solution to the game and, therefore, that
the inequality in (19) is satisfied as equality. These observations lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let u ∈ P(Γ) and v ∈ P(E) and define
η = N Tu and `v(Γ) = min
γ∈Γ
`v(γ).
Then (u, v) solves the game if and only if
`v(Γ) ≥ ‖η‖∞. (20)
Moreover, if (u, v) solves the game, then
suppu ⊆ {γ ∈ Γ : `v(γ) = `v(Γ)} (21)
and
supp v ⊆ {e ∈ E : η(e) = ‖η‖∞}. (22)
Proof. From (15), we have
max
v∈P(E)
Eu,v[N (γ, e)] = max
v∈P(E)
Ev[η(e)] = ‖η‖∞.
Similarly, by (16),
min
u∈P(Γ)
Eu,v[N (γ, e)] = min
u∈P(Γ)
Eu[`v(γ)] = `v(Γ).
Substituting these two expressions into (18) shows that an equilibrium is characterized by the
equality
‖η‖∞ = `v(Γ).
Moreover, substituting into the minimax theorem (19) shows that
max
v∈P(E)
`v(Γ) ≤ min
u∈P(Γ)
‖η‖∞ .
Thus, (20) is necessary and sufficient to characterize an equilibrium.
The additional necessary conditions (21) and (22) are a consequence of (18). Let (u, v) be an
equilibrium point and let η = N Tu. Then, (18) implies that
‖η‖∞ = Eu,v[N (γ, e)] = Ev[η(e)]. (23)
This equality can only hold if v is supported on edges where η attains its maximum, establish-
ing (22). A similar argument establishes (21).
Remark 3.1. Theorem 3.1 can also be seen as a corollary of Theorem 3.2. Indeed, if γ ∈ Γ and
e ∈ E then the pure strategies u = δγ ∈ P(Γ) and v = δe ∈ P(E) have the properties that
‖η‖∞ = 1 and `v(γ′) = N (γ′, e) ∀γ′ ∈ Γ.
Thus, by Theorem 3.2, the pair (u, v) solves the game if and only if e ∈ γ′ for every γ′ ∈ Γ, that is,
if and only if e is a “bridge” in the graph.
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4 Using modulus to solve the game
Now, we show that the solution to the spanning tree modulus problem provides a solution to the
game. The connection is made through the concept of feasible partitions, as defined in [6].
Definition 4.1. A feasible partition Q of a graph G = (V,E) is a partition of the vertex set V into
kQ > 1 pieces: Q = {V1, V2, . . . , VkQ} such that the subgraph of G induced by Vi is connected for
each i = 1, 2, . . . , kQ. The edge set EQ ⊆ E of Q is the set of all edges of E that connect distinct
pieces of the partition. The weight w(Q) of Q is defined as w(Q) = |EQ|/(kQ − 1). In the case
kQ = 2, the definition of a feasible partition coincides with the definition of a global graph cut and
w(Q) = |EQ| is the usual definition of the weight of such a cut. We denote by F(G) the set of all
feasible partitions of G.
An important relationship between spanning trees and feasible partitions arises from the fact
that, for a given feasible partition Q and spanning tree γ, the spanning tree must connect all pieces
of the partition, yielding the inequality (see [6, (2.2)])
|γ ∩ EQ| ≥ kQ − 1. (24)
The relationship between modulus and the secure broadcast game is provided by the following
theorem, proved in [4].
Theorem 4.1. Let Γ be the family of spanning trees on the graph G = (V,E) and let µ∗ ∈ P(Γ)
be optimal for the MEO problem (11), with expected edge usage η∗ = N Tµ∗. Define
EQ∗ := {e ∈ E : η∗(e) = ‖η∗‖∞}.
Then EQ∗ is the edge set for a feasible partition Q
∗ of V into kQ∗ > 1 pieces and has the following
three properties.
|γ ∩ EQ∗ | = kQ∗ − 1 ∀γ ∈ supp µ∗, (25)
η∗(e) = ‖η∗‖∞ = w(Q∗)−1 ∀e ∈ EQ∗ , (26)
w(Q∗) = min
Q∈F(G)
w(Q). (27)
This provides the solution to the secure broadcast game as follows.
Theorem 4.2. Using the definitions from Theorem 4.1, let u∗ = µ∗ ∈ P(Γ) and let v∗ ∈ P(E)
be the uniform distribution on EQ∗. Then (u
∗, v∗) is a Nash equilibrium solution to the game.
Moreover,
Eu∗,v∗ [N (γ, e)] = ‖η∗‖∞ = w(Q∗)−1. (28)
Proof. In order to verify that the given mixed strategies solve the game, we use Theorem 3.2, which
shows that it is sufficient to establish that (20) holds. Equation (26) establishes the second equality
in (28). Let γ ∈ Γ be any spanning tree. Then, since Q∗ is a feasible partition, (24) shows that
`v∗(γ) =
∑
e∈E
N (γ, e)v∗(e) = 1|EQ∗ |
∑
e∈EQ∗
N (γ, e) = |γ ∩ EQ∗ ||EQ∗ | ≥
kQ∗ − 1
|EQ∗ | = w(Q
∗)−1 = ‖η∗‖∞.
Taking the minimum with respect to γ ∈ Γ establishes (20). The first equality in (28) then follows
from (23).
Remark 4.1. Although it was not formulated in the present game-theoretic notation, Cunning-
ham [7] studied the quantity w(Q∗) in (26) (called the strength of G) and provided an algorithm
for finding Q∗.
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4.1 1-modulus versus 2-modulus
Above, we have given a method for solving the broadcast game using the solution of a 2-modulus
problem. The solution given in [10, Theorem 2], on the other hand, is equivalent to the solution of
the corresponding 1-modulus problem. Indeed, the Lagrangian dual to the 1-modulus problem is
(see [2, Equation (7)])
maximize 1Tλ,
subject to N Tλ ≤ 1, λ ≥ 0. (29)
The connection between (29) and [10, Equation (16)] can be made through the probabilistic inter-
pretation of modulus [5]. If λ in (29) is split as λ = νµ with ν ≥ 0 and µ ∈ P(Γ), then an optimal
λ∗ satisfies λ∗ = w(Q∗)µ∗∞, where µ∗∞ is any pmf satisfying max
e∈E
Eµ∗∞ [N (γ, e)] = w(Q∗)−1. This
implies that any such optimal µ∗∞ is a solution to [10, Equation (16)]. Thus, although [10] does not
explicitly use the vocabulary of modulus, we will refer to this method of solving the game as the
1-modulus approach.
While conceptually similar, the 1-modulus and 2-modulus approaches to the game have some
significant differences. The 1-modulus approach involves first finding a critical subset of edges
(essentially, finding Q∗). This provides the value of the game as well as an optimal strategy for E.
Although not explicitly described in the paper, an optimal strategy for B would presumably then
be found by solving the linear program [10, Equation (16)]. Recently in [18] the value of the game
and strategies of both players were discussed in a more general matroid setting using a different
approach.
A 2-modulus approach to solving the game, on the other hand, proceeds by first finding the
optimal ρ∗ for (3) by using an exterior-point algorithm as described in [5]. The edges of Q∗ are
then readily obtained by locating the edges on which ρ∗ is maximized, giving an optimal strategy
for E. Although the algorithm described only provides an approximation ρ′ ≈ ρ∗ to within some
specified tolerance, it is nevertheless possible to determine Q∗ exactly by using a consequence of
the deflation process described in [4]. Namely that the value ρ∗(e)/Mod2(Γ) is a proper fraction
on every edge with denominator bounded by |E|. Thus, by selecting a suitably small tolerance,
one can determine on exactly which edges ρ∗ is maximized by considering the edges on which ρ′ is
approximately maximized.
Moreover, the optimal dual variables λ∗ can be rescaled to produce an optimal µ∗ as described
above, thus giving an optimal strategy for B with no additional work. This is particularly effective
on larger graphs with large numbers of spanning trees; by using an exterior-point approach, one
typically only needs to explore a tiny fraction of the constraints in order to get an accurate solution.
Another interesting aspect of the difference between the 1-modulus and 2-modulus approaches
to the game is the fact that the 2-modulus problem is more restrictive; a 2-modulus solution will
also be a 1-modulus solution, but not the other way around. A simple illustration of this idea can
be seen in the following example.
Consider the graph shown in Figure 5, formed by connecting two copies of K5 by two bridges.
Since at least one of the two bridges must be used in any spanning tree, the value of the secure
broadcast game must be at least 1/2. An optimal strategy for B can be constructed as follows.
Let T1 and T2 be the disjoint spanning trees of G shown in Figure 6. If µ is the pmf that chooses
between these two trees with 1/2 probability each, then the maximum expected edge usage is 1/2,
attained on the edges of γ1 ∪ γ2, as shown on the left of Figure 5. The optimal strategy for E is to
choose between the two bridge edges uniformly.
On the other hand, consider the 2-modulus solution. In this case, even though the optimal pmf
µ∗ may not be unique, the optimal expected edge usage η∗ is. These values are shown on the right
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Figure 5: On the left, one possible choice of η∗∞ = N Tµ∗∞ for the 1-modulus problem, on the right,
the unique η∗ = N Tµ∗ for the 2-modulus problem.
Figure 6: A pair of disjoint spanning trees, T1 and T2.
of Figure 5. Observe that, following this strategy, B uses each non-bridge edge only 2/5 of the
time.
The difference between the two solutions can be understood through the probabilistic interpre-
tation of modulus. The 1-modulus approach corresponds to finding a pmf µ and corresponding
expected edge usage vector η = N Tµ that minimizes ‖η‖∞. The 2-modulus approach, on the
other hand, corresponds to minimizing the variance of η (see [4]). Both options shown in Figure 5
minimize the maximum value, but only the one on the right minimizes the variance.
5 Examples
In this section, we demonstrate the connection between modulus and the broadcast game with a
few illustrative examples.
5.1 The house graph
As a simple example of the theory developed above, consider the broadcast game on the house
graph shown in Figure 7. We shall demonstrate how the theory of modulus can be used to solve
the secure broadcast game, using the theory developed in [4]. We begin with a definition of the
concept of a homogeneous graph.
Definition 5.1. A graph G is said to be homogeneous (with respect to spanning tree modulus) if
the unique edge usage probability vector η∗ = N Tµ∗ is constant (i.e., parallel to the vector 1). A
graph that is not homogeneous is called nonhomogeneous.
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house graph γ1 γ2 γ3
γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7
γ8 γ9 γ10 γ11
Figure 7: The house graph and its spanning trees.
Homogeneous graphs play a special role in the theory of spanning tree modulus; they essentially
form a collection of “atoms” into which any graph can be decomposed. The reader is directed to [4]
for details. Here, we reproduce one important theorem [4, Corollary 4.5]
Theorem 5.1. A graph G is homogeneous if an only if there exists a pmf µ ∈ P(Γ) so that
Pµ(e ∈ γ) is independent of e ∈ E. If such a pmf exists, it is optimal for the MEO problem (11)
and
Pµ(e ∈ γ) = |V | − 1|E| .
To see how this theorem applies in the case of the house, first note that the house has 5 vertices
and 6 edges, so (|V | − 1)/|E| = 2/3. If we can find a pmf µ that gives every edge a 2/3 probability
of inclusion in the random tree γ, then Theorem 5.1 proves the optimality of µ. In fact, there
are infinitely many such µ in this case. For example, using the enumeration of spanning trees in
Figure 7, consider the pmf µ that selects uniformly among the three trees γ1, γ9 and γ10. It is
straightforward to verify that each edge appears in exactly two of these three trees and, therefore,
that Pµ(e ∈ γ) = 2/3 for this choice of µ.
Once one optimal pmf µ∗ is found, the set of all optimal pmfs can be expressed as the polyhedron{
z ∈ RΓ : N T z = 0, 1T z = 0, µ∗ + z ≥ 0} .
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For the house, this polyhedron can be shown to have six vertices, each of the form µ = 13
(
δγi + δγj + δγk
)
.
In other words, the polyhedron of optimal pmfs is generated by six pmfs, each of which is uniformly
distributed on a set of three spanning trees. These six sets are
{γ1, γ9, γ10}, {γ1, γ8, γ11}, {γ5, γ7, γ8}, {γ3, γ6, γ11}, {γ3, γ7, γ9}, and {γ5, γ6, γ10}.
It is interesting to note that two spanning trees, γ2 and γ4, are absent from these sets. In other
words, neither γ2 nor γ4 is in the support of any optimal pmf. These two trees are examples of the
forbidden trees defined in [4]. There are several ways to see why such forbidden trees might exist
in general. Here, we provide a proof specific to the house graph.
Theorem 5.2. If µ ∈ P(Γ) is optimal for the MEO problem (11) on the house graph, then
suppµ ⊂ Γ \ {γ2, γ4},
using the spanning tree enumeration given in Figure 7.
Proof. As observed above, the pmf µ = 13 (δγ1 + δγ9 + δγ10) has the property that Pµ(e ∈ γ) ≡ 2/3.
By Theorem 5.1, then, the house graph is homogeneous and µ is optimal for the MEO problem. By
the uniqueness of η∗ in (12), it follows that every optimal pmf has uniform edge usage probabilities
equal to 2/3. Let µ be any optimal pmf and let E′ ⊂ E be the top three edges of the house (the
roof and ceiling). Observe that
|γ ∩ E′| =
{
1 if γ ∈ {γ2, γ4},
2 if γ ∈ Γ \ {γ2, γ4}.
So,
3 · 2
3
= 2 =
∑
e∈E′
η∗(e) =
∑
e∈E′
∑
γ∈Γ
N (γ, e)µ(γ) =
∑
γ∈Γ
µ(γ)
∑
e∈E′
N (γ, e) =
∑
γ∈Γ
µ(γ)|γ ∩ E′|
= 2
(∑
γ∈Γ
µ(γ)
)
− µ(γ2)− µ(γ4) = 2− µ(γ2)− µ(γ4).
This is only possible if µ(γ2) = µ(γ4) = 0.
5.2 Other homogeneous graphs
A consequence of the connection between modulus and the broadcast game is that the value of
the game on a homogeneous graph is (|V | − 1)/|E|. This is interesting because homogeneity can
sometimes be established without an explicit construction of an optimal pmf. Take, for example,
the complete graph Kn. From the symmetry of the graph, it is straightforward to show that the
optimal density ρ∗ for the modulus problem is uniform and, therefore, so is η∗. While it is possible
to construct an optimal pmf for Kn (for example, choose a vertex uniformly at random and take
the star of edges incident upon this vertex), we can use homogeneity to establish that the value of
the broadcast game on Kn is 2/n.
Similarly, consider an arbitrary connected d-regular graph. In [4], it was shown that almost
every such graph is homogeneous. Thus, it follows that the value of the broadcast game on almost
every d-regular graph is 2(|V |−1)d|V | . Unlike in the case of Kn, it is not as immediately evident how to
construct an optimal pmf for an arbitrary d-regular graph.
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‖η∗‖∞ = 1.0 ‖η∗‖∞ = 0.5 ‖η∗‖∞ = 0.385
‖η∗‖∞ = 0.357 ‖η∗‖∞ = 0.333 ‖η∗‖∞ = 0.323
Figure 8: The maximum value of η∗ (associated with 2-modulus) for a sequence of graphs. The
darkened edges show where η∗ attains its maximum.
5.3 The effect of adding edges
As a final example, we consider the effect that adding edges has on the value of the game. To
begin, consider the graph shown in the upper left corner of Figure 8, formed by connecting a copy
of K5 to a copy of K6 by a single bridge. This is an example of a 1-connected graph considered in
Theorem 3.1. Since every spanning tree must use the bridge, the value of the game is 1 (E always
wins).
The top middle portion of the figure shows the effect of adding an additional bridge between the
two complete components. In this case, the broadcaster is forced to use at least one of these two
bridges. The solution to the game involves the broadcaster choosing trees that use exactly one of
the bridges in such a way that each bridge is used half the time. The eavesdropper chooses among
the two edges uniformly, giving a 50% chance that the eavesdropper will intercept the broadcast.
One might expect that adding a third bridge (the top right portion of the figure) would result in
a game with value 1/3 (the broadcaster chooses trees that use exactly one of the three bridges and
the eavesdropper chooses uniformly among the three edges). However, this pair of strategies is not
optimal. Indeed, if B were to choose this strategy, then every spanning tree selected by B would
restrict as a spanning tree to the K5 component and, therefore, would use 4 of the 10 edges there.
So E could win 40% of the time by choosing uniformly among the edges of the K5 component. In
the solution shown, the broadcaster is able to choose a random tree that performs better than this.
The eavesdropper is forced to choose uniformly among a larger set of edges (the 13 darker edges)
and will win only 38.5% of the time. In this case, the minimum feasible partition consists of placing
all nodes of the K6 component into a single part and separating each node of K5 into its own part.
This gives a partition Q with kQ = 6 and |EQ| = 13, so w(Q)−1 = 5/13 ≈ 0.3846. When run on
this example, the modulus algorithm from [5] produces an optimal pmf µ∗ supported on 23 trees.
An optimal strategy for B, therefore, is to choose from among those 23 spanning trees according to
the pmf µ∗. Figure 9 shows the first 9 spanning trees ordered according to the value of optimal pmf
µ∗. Observe that the spanning trees shown always restrict as spanning trees of the K6 component.
This is a consequence of the fact that the K6 subgraph, in this case, is a homogeneous core as
described in [4]. On the other hand, the trees in the figure do not, in general, restrict as trees of
the K5 subgraph (which would require only one of the three bridge edges to be present). Indeed,
the third row shows spanning trees that use two of the three bridges. Some of the lower-probability
trees (not shown in the figure) even use all three bridges.
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Pr = 9.409% Pr = 9.305% Pr = 8.205%
Pr = 6.938% Pr = 5.462% Pr = 4.364%
Pr = 3.425% Pr = 3.370% Pr = 2.005%
Figure 9: Nine spanning trees with largest value of µ∗.
Adding a fourth bridge has a similar effect (bottom left portion of the figure). Upon adding
a fifth bridge, the graph become homogeneous; the minimum feasible partition is the trivial one,
separating each node into its own part. For this partition kQ = 11, |EQ| = 30 and w(Q)−1 = 1/3.
For comparison we have shown ‖η0‖∞ from the uniform pmf µ0 in Figure 10. Again, we
start with the graph in the upper left corner of Figure 10. Since every spanning tree has to use
the bridge the expected edge usage is 1 on that edge, and E wins by listening there. When a
second edge is added, a broadcaster choosing uniformly among spanning trees will overuse the two
bridges, sometimes picking trees that use both. (Compare this with the optimal strategy for B
described above.) By the time a third bridge is added, the difference between the uniform and
optimal strategies is striking. The uniform broadcaster uses each of the three bridges over half the
time while the optimal broadcaster, by optimally using the minimum feasible partition, forces the
eavesdropper to choose among 13 edges, each used no more than 38.5% of the time.
A key observation here is that choosing uniformly among spanning trees does not guarantee
an even distribution of edge usage. Consider, for example, the bottom right portion of the figure.
From the previous figure, we know it is possible for B to ensure that all edges are equally likely
to occur. However, the uniform distribution uses one edge (the far left one) more than any other
edge.
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